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Abstract. We present a novel approach for proving secrecy properties of security
protocols by mechanized flow analysis. In contrast to existing tools for proving
secrecy by abstract interpretation, our tool enjoys cryptographic soundness in the
strong sense of blackbox reactive simulatability/UC which entails that secrecy
properties proven by our tool are automatically guaranteed to hold for secure
cryptographic implementations of the analyzed protocol, with respect to the more
fine-grained cryptographic secrecy definitions and adversary models.
Our tool is capable of reasoning about a comprehensive language for expressing
protocols, in particular handling symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryp-
tion, and it produces proofs for an unbounded number of sessions in the presence
of an active adversary. We have implemented the tool and applied it to a number
of common protocols from the literature.
1 Introduction
Security proofs of cryptographic protocols are known to be difficult and the automation
of such proofs has been studied soon after the first protocols were developed. From
the start, the actual cryptographic operations in such proofs were idealized into so-
called Dolev-Yao models, following [2–4], e.g., see [5–10]. This idealization simplifies
proof construction by freeing proofs from cryptographic details such as computational
restrictions, probabilistic behavior, and error probabilities. Conducting secrecy proofs
by typing based on these abstractions has shown to be a particularly salient technique as
it allowed for elegant and fully automated proofs, often even for an unbounded number
of sessions.
A type system was recently presented in [11] that combines the conciseness of
language-based reasoning in Dolev-Yao models with strong computational soundness
guarantees, i.e., if an abstract protocol typechecks then its cryptographic realization
provably keeps the quantities handed to it by the protocol users (payload data) se-
cret in the computational sense. Such computational soundness guarantees of abstract
proofs have recently been identified as central for gaining trustworthy guarantees of
? An earlier version of this work appeared in [1].
security protocols: the computational model strives for stronger, more fine-grained se-
curity notions and furthermore considers a more realistic adversary that is allowed to
perform arbitrary bitstring manipulations as long as they can be performed in proba-
bilistic polynomial-time. However, despite being the first type system that allows for
abstract, computationally sound reasoning under active attacks, the major drawback of
[11] was that type inference was not considered. As a consequence, this work did not
entail an automated procedure for analyzing secrecy aspects of cryptographic protocols
with cryptographic soundness guarantees, which arguably is the central goal of unifying
the advantages of both approaches.
We remedy this shortcoming by presenting a mechanized approach for soundly
proving secrecy of payload data in cryptographic protocols by analysing the possible
flows of data during the execution of the protocol. Our approach is capable of reason-
ing about a comprehensive language for expressing protocols, in particular handling
symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption, allows for more precise analyses
compared with the type system of [11], is fully automated, and produces proofs for an
unbounded number of sessions in the presence of an active adversary.
Our results (and the one of [11] as well) rely on a variant of the Dolev-Yao model
of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner, henceforth called the BPW model, which has been
shown to be computationally sound in the strong sense of of blackbox reactive simu-
latability (BRSIM). The security notion of BRSIM means that one system (here, the
cryptographic realization) can be plugged into arbitrary protocols instead of another
system (here, the BPW model) [12–15]. While first security proofs of several common
protocols have been hand-crafted using the BPW model [16–21], recent work has shown
that the BPW model is accessible to theorem proving techniques as well [22]. Our work
shows that soundly proving secrecy properties in a fully automated manner is possible
using the BPW model, and it identifies cryptographically sound secrecy by typing as
a promising direction for future work in general. In particular, our line complements
the large number of existing works that aims at establishing computational soundness
of Dolev-Yao models without considering secrecy by typing, cf. the section on related
work for more details.
The analysis presented in this paper builds on the spi-calculus-style language, its
deterministic semantics and the corresponding type system from [11] and is inspired by
methods from control flow analysis. It works by collecting for each defined variable
at each protocol point the possible shapes of terms that this variable may point to,
including the possible creation points of the atomic subterms. The same information
is also collected for channels between participants for encryption keys, thus yielding
information which terms may be communicated over which channel, and which terms
may be encrypted with which keys by honest participants, respectively. Finally, the
same abstraction is also collected for terms that the adversary may learn during the run
of the protocol.
There are a couple of noteworthy points. First, all inputs from the adversary are
modeled using a single abstract value, thus freeing the analyser from the necessity to
model every new term that the adversary may construct. Instead, we consider explicit
rules for decomposing this abstract value, i.e., the adversary’s input, which allows us to
keep the description of the adversary’s knowledge finite. Secondly, parts of the protocol
statically following a public-key decryption are analysed twice — once assuming that
the ciphertext was created by an honest participant and once assuming that it was cre-
ated by the adversary. The distinction of these two cases (which was already present in
[23] and also in [11]) is important for the precision of the analyser. Thirdly, we collect
not only the possible values of variables but also relationships between them. When-
ever certain operations restrict the set of possible values of some variables, we exploit
these recorded relationships in order to restrict the set of values of related variables as
well. This collection of relationships is reminiscent of shape analysis [24], although
our task is considerably simpler here than a full shape analysis because we do not have
destructive updates. We record the relationships between variables by collecting a set
of constraints that their abstractions must satisfy.
Our prover (consisting of constraint generator and solver) has been imple-
mented in O’Caml and can be downloaded at http://www.ut.ee/˜peeter_l/
research/brsiman.
1.1 Related Work
Early work on linking Dolev-Yao-style symbolic models and cryptography [25–28]
only considered passive attacks, and therefore cannot make general statements about
protocols.
The security notion of BRSIM was first defined generally in [12], based on simu-
latability definitions for secure (one-step) function evaluation. It was extended in [14,
13], the latter with somewhat different details and called UC (universal composabil-
ity), and has been widely applied to prove individual cryptographic systems secure and
to derive general theoretical results. In particular, BRSIM/UC allows for plugging one
system into arbitrary protocols instead of another system while retaining essentially
arbitrary security properties [12, 13, 39].
A cryptographic justification of a Dolev-Yao model in the sense of BRSIM/UC was
first given in [30]. Extensions of this BRSIM/UC result to more cryptographic primi-
tives were presented in [31–33] and used in protocol proofs [16–21]. General theorems
on property preservation through the BRSIM notion imply that the same Dolev-Yao
model and realization also fulfill some other soundness notions [12, 34–36, 34, 37, 38],
and further soundness results specific to this Dolev-Yao model and realization were
proved in [39]. Some later papers [40–42] considered to what extent restrictions to
weaker security properties or less general protocol classes allow simplifications com-
pared with [30]: Laud [41] has presented cryptographic foundations for a Dolev-Yao
model of symmetric encryption but specific to certain confidentiality properties where
the surrounding protocols are restricted to straight-line programs. Warinschi et al. [40,
43] have presented cryptographic underpinnings for a Dolev-Yao model of public-key
encryption, yet for a restricted class of protocols and protocol properties that can be
analyzed using this primitive. Baudet, Cortier, and Kremer [44] have established the
soundness of specific classes of equational theories in a Dolev-Yao model under pas-
sive attacks. Canetti and Herzog [42] have shown that a Dolev-Yao-style symbolic anal-
ysis can be conducted using the framework of universal composability for a restricted
class of protocols, namely mutual authentication and key exchange protocols with the
additional constraint that the protocols must be expressible as loop-free programs us-
ing public-key encryption as their only cryptographic operation. We stress that none of
these works build on type inference for proving secrecy properties of security protocols.
Since computational soundness has become a highly active line of research, we exem-
plarily list further recent results in this area without going into further details [45–50,
33, 51].
The work that comes closest to our work is the work of Laud [11] who designed a
type system for proving secrecy aspects of security protocols based on the BPW model.
He shows that if an abstract protocol typechecks in his system, then its cryptographic
realization provably keeps the quantities handed to it by the protocol users secret in the
computational sense. The proof of this fact exploits the BRSIM/UC soundness result
of [30, 32, 29] for carrying over symbolic proofs of secrecy in the BPW model to the
actual cryptographic realization, similar to the present paper. However, type inference
has not been implemented yet in this paper so that the paper did not entail a mechanized
procedure for soundly proving secrecy aspects of security protocols.
Efforts are also under way to formulate syntactic calculi with a probabilistic,
polynomial-time semantics, including approaches based on process algebra [52, 53],
security logics [54, 55] and cryptographic games [56]. In particular, Datta et al. [55]
have proposed a promising logical deduction system to prove computational security
properties. We are not aware of any implementations of these frameworks, except for
Blanchet’s [56], who has recently presented an automated tool for proving secrecy prop-
erties of security protocols based on transforming cryptographic games. This line of
work is orthogonal to the work of justifying Dolev-Yao models, which offer a higher
level of abstractions and thus much simpler proofs where applicable, so that proofs of
larger systems can be automated.
Let us also mention some of the work in the area of type systems for cryptographic
protocol analysis. The first type system of this kind was proposed by Abadi [57], which
could be used for verifying the secrecy of payloads or nonces in the protocols using
only symmetric encryption. This type system, as well as all the remaining ones that we
describe work in the Dolev-Yao model. The type system was extended to cope with
asymmetric encryption by Abadi and Blanchet [23]. Abadi and Blanchet [58] further
generalized this type system to handle generic cryptographic primitives. The type sys-
tem of Abadi has also been extended by Gordon and Jeffrey [59–61] to check for in-
tegrity properties. Finally, a static program analysis [62] and a type system [63] exist
that work directly in the computational model, handling programs containing symmet-
ric encryption, both for passive adversaries only.
Abstract interpretation, which is in most cases automatable using data flow analysis,
has also been considered for the analysis of cryptographic protocols within the Dolev-
Yao model. See for example [64] and the references contained therein.
1.2 Structure of the paper
We start by describing our (machine-based) execution model and the language used
to program these machines for expressing security protocols in Sec. 2. We continue in
Sec. 3 with the description of the analysis. In particular, we give the correctness theorem
stating under which conditions the results of the abstract analysis entail computational
security of a cryptographic protocol. Sec. 4 describes the implementation of our tool
and its applicability to common security protocols from the literature. In Sec. 5 we give
the main technical lemma, similar to subject reduction, used to prove the previously
given correctness theorem.
2 Execution Model
We use the same setup of a system as in [11]. In short, the BPW model (sometimes also
called abstract cryptographic library in the following corresponding to the original title
of [30]) for n honest users is implemented by a machine THn which has input ports
inui? to receive commands from the i-th user, output ports outui ! to return the results of
commands and (handles of) received messages, ports ina? and outa! for the communi-
cation with the adversary, and a database of terms. The database records the structure of
messages and the knowledge of messages by the parties (n users and the adversary). The
users and the adversary access messages through handles, the transmission of messages
involves the translation of handles. The possible commands are the construction, taking
apart, and sending of messages. The protocol logic for the i-th user is implemented by
a machine Pi that connects to the ports inui? and outui ! and offers the ports pinui? and
poutui ! to the user through which it may send and receive data. An execution step of a
machine Pi consists of receiving a message (either from THn or the user), performing
some computations on the terms, and optionally sending a message. The machines Pi
are programmed in a language resembling the spi-calculus, defined below.
e ::= n | keypair` | store(x)
| x | retrieve(x) | list(x1, . . . , xk)
| pubkey(x) | pubenc`(xk, xt)
| privenc`(xk, xt) | piji (x)
| gen symenc key(i)` | pubdec(xk, xt)
| privdec(xk, xt) | gen nonce`
SIP ::= receive`c[xp](x)
IP ::= SIP | !SIP
I ::= IP .P
I∗ ::= 0 | I | I∗
P ::= I∗ | II
| sendc[xp](x).I∗
| let` x := e in P
else P ′
| if ` x = x′ then P
else P ′
Here x-s are variables, e-s are expressions, I-s are input processes, P -s are output pro-
cesses, and `-s are labels for program points and expressions of interest. No label may
occur twice in the protocol text, nor can a variable be defined twice or used before being
defined. The language contains public-key and symmetric-key encryption as the cryp-
tographic primitives (as well as nonces). A public and secret key pair is created by the
expression keypair, the public key is extracted by pubkey. A level i is associated with
each symmetric key to prevent encryption cycles (and make the proof relating THn and
its concrete implementation go through); a symmetric key may only encrypt keys of
lower level. The store- and retrieve-expressions are used to convert payloads (data that
can be communicated with the user) to handles and back. The expression piji (x) extracts
the i-th component from the list of length j pointed to by x. In receivec[xp](x) and
sendc[xp](x), the variable x is the message and xp is the identity of the other party.
The channel for the message is given by the constant abstract channel c. An abstract
channel is used to group messages sent between protocol participants, as well as be-
tween the protocol user and participant (although the abstract channel does not alone
determine the sender and the receiver of a message). Furthermore, the set of abstract
channels Chan is partitioned into four parts, denoted Chanx, where x ∈ {s, a, i, u}.
If a message is sent on an abstract channel from Chans [resp. Chana, Chani] then
it means that the message travels between protocol participants over a secure (resp.
authentic, insecure) channel. If a message is sent on an abstract channel from Chanu
then it travels between the protocol user and the protocol participant (i.e. over one of
the concrete channels pinui or poutui ). The variables x and xp are bound in a receive-
statement. The variable x is also bound in the default-branch of a let-statement, but not
in the else-branch, which is taken upon a failure of evaluating e.
The internal state of an inactive (i.e. not currently running) Pi consists of a list of
input processes together with their execution environments, giving values to already de-
fined variables. The “program” (or initial state) of each Pi is a list of input processes. An
active Pi additionally contains the received message (together with the apparent sender
and the name of the channel it was received on) and the currently running (output) pro-
cess (together with its environment). When Pi receives the message, it is handed over
to the first input process (!)receivec[xp](x).P with matching channel name c in its list
of processes. The variables x and xp are bound to the message and the apparent sender
and the process executes until it has become II or a list of input processes I∗. The value
II means rejecting the message — the list of input processes of Pi is not changed, the
currently executing process and its environment are discarded (thereby forgetting all
references to any new terms that may have been created since receiving that message)
and the message is handed over to the next input process with the matching channel
name in the list of input processes of Pi. When a process accepts the message, it ex-
ecutes until it has become a list of input processes I∗. All processes in this list I∗,
together with the environment of the output process, are put to the list of input pro-
cesses of Pi instead of or in addition of (depending on the presence of replication) the
original process. When no process accepts the message, it is simply lost.
Security
The security property we are interested in is the secrecy of payloads [29]. We also
considered the same property in [11] and our treatment here does not differ from that.
In short, we want the system implementing the protocol (consisting of the machines
P1, . . . ,Pn and THn) to retain the secrecy of any payloads handed to it by the users over
the ports pinui?. The secrecy of payloads means that the user and the adversary together
cannot figure out whether the system implementing the protocol is really computing
with the values received from the user or with some other values. In the definition of
payload secrecy, there is a scrambler / descrambler inserted between the user and the
system implementing the protocol. If it is turned on, it replaces all messages from the
user to the system (i.e. all payloads) with random values; and replaces these random
values, if they are sent from the system to the user, with the values received from the
user again. The user (together with the adversary) has to guess whether the scrambler
/ descrambler is turned on. If the user cannot guess then the payloads are kept secure
in the system — they do not flow from the user through the system to the adversary.
A precise definition can be found in [29] and a concise description in [11]. In [11] the
following five properties were stated to be sufficient for the secrecy of payloads and for
the simulatability of the machine THn:
(I) the bit-strings that the machines Pi receive from the ports pinui? do not affect the
control flow of Pi, i.e. this data is not used in the if -statements;
(II) the machines Pi may pass the bit-strings received from the user to the cryptographic
library only in store-commands;
(III) the terms resulting from these store-commands will not become available to the
adversary, i.e. the adversary does not get handles for these terms.
(IV) symmetric keys of order i only encrypt terms of order less than i (note that sym-
metric keys created by the adversary have no order and are thereby not restricted
by this condition);
(V) if a symmetric key unknown to the adversary (i.e. the adversary does not have a
handle to it) is used for encryption then this key will never become known to the
adversary.
The analysis presented in this paper verifies that these five properties hold.
A different secrecy property was also considered in [29] — the secrecy of keys gen-
erated by the system during the protocol run. We do not consider this property here,
although a corresponding list of sufficient properties would not be difficult to fix (key
secrecy can be considered a simpler property than payload secrecy); and these proper-
ties could also be verified by our analysis. However, this remains future work.
3 Analysis
We set up a constraint system whose solutions upper-approximate the values flowing
through the protocol. A constraint system consists of two main parts — constraint vari-
ables and the set of constraints. A constraint variable is just an identifier together with an
associated domain (an upper semilattice) of possible values. A constraint is a statement
of the form E ≤ C where C is a constraint variable and E is a monotone expression
over constraint variables. A solution of a constraint system is a valuation, mapping each
constraint variable to a value in its domain, such that all constraints are satisfied.
We will prove that any solution to our constraint system will be a safe approximation
of any possible protocol run. To get the best precision, we are interested in the least
solution. There are well-known methods for finding the least solutions for constraint
systems with monotone constraints.
3.1 Abstract Domain
The possible values of protocol variables are abstracted by sets of the following ab-
stract values AV . The sets of abstract values are used as domains for certain constraint
variables below.
AV ::= AV I | AVH | seckey(`, b) AV I = XP | XS
AVH ::= pubenc(AVH ,AVH , `, b) | nonce(`, b)
| symenc(AVH ,AVH , `, b) | AnyPubVal
| symkeyname(`, b) | pubkey(`, b)
| (AVH , . . . ,AVH) | store(AVI )
| symkey(i, `, b)
(1)
Here AV I contains the possible abstractions of payloads — they may be either pub-
lic (XP) or secret (XS). The addresses of the communication partners (variable xp in
send- and receive-commands) are public. Data received from the protocol users are
secret. The terms AVH are the possible abstractions of terms in the database of THn.
They should be mostly self-descriptive. The arguments ` refer to program points (labels
at expressions) where these values have been created. The arguments b also resemble
program points — we have mentioned before that we analyse the parts of the proto-
col following a public-key decryption twice — once assuming that the ciphertext was
generated by a protocol participant and once assuming that it was generated by the ad-
versary. Hence, if n public-key decryptions occur before the program point ` then this
point really counts as 2n different program points for the analysis. If ` is a program
point following n decryptions then b is a bit-string of length n where i-th bit records
the assumed creator of the i-th decrypted ciphertext (1 — some honest participant; 0 —
the adversary). We call b the decryption context.
The argument i in symkey(i, `, b) records the level of the symmetric key. The ab-
stract value symkeyname(`, b) corresponds to the identities of the symmetric keys cre-
ated at the program point ` (with the decryption context b). According to THn, the
adversary is able to find the identities of symmetric keys from the ciphertexts created
with them. The abstract value AnyPubVal denotes any value that the adversary knows
and may have constructed. All other AVH denote values constructed by protocol par-
ticipants. The secret decryption keys seckey(`, b) are not listed as a possible case for
AVH because THn puts severe restrictions on their use — they may only be used for
decrypting ciphertexts; they cannot appear as subterms of more complex terms.
3.2 Constraint Variables
Given a protocol ℘with its set of labels, we introduce the following constraint variables.
First, Sb` for all statement labels ` occurring in the protocol (here we only consider
the labels of if -, let- and receive-statements, not the labels occurring in expressions).
Here b is a bit-string whose length equals the number asymmetric decryption operations
that occur in the protocol before and including the point labeled with `. Hence for a
program point ` that is preceded by n asymmetric decryptions we have 2n different
variables Sb`.
Let Var◦` be the set of variables defined before the protocol point `. Let Var
•
`
be the union of Var◦` with the set of protocol variables that are assigned a value at `
(depending on whether ` labels an if -, let- or receive-statement, this set has 0, 1 or
2 elements). The possible values for Sb` are mappings from Var
•
` to sets of abstract
values AV . These mappings are ordered pointwise, with the sets of abstract values AV
ordered by subset inclusion.
The variable Sb` records the possible values of protocol variables after a successful
completion of the operation at program point `. A let- or if -statement is successful if
the default-/true-branch was taken. A receive-statement is always successful.
Second, Rb` for all statement labels ` occurring in the protocol and b having the
same possible values as for Sb` (and ordered the same way). These constraint variables
are introduced to ease the presentation of the constraint system. Namely, the handling
of a statement (if it succeeds) proceeds in two steps: first the constraints giving the
abstraction(s) of the newly defined variable(s) are evaluated, followed by the evaluation
of constraints describing the relationships between the values of different variables. The
constraint variable Sb` contains the result of these two steps. The constraint variable R
b
`
contains the result of the first step only.
Third, Cc for all abstract channels c ∈ Chans ∪Chana occurring in the protocol.
The possible values of these variables are sets of abstract values AVH , ordered by
subset inclusion. These variables will record an abstraction of the possible messages
sent over the abstract channel c.
Fourth,P. This will record the values that the adversary knows. The possible values
of this variable are sets of abstract values AV , ordered by subset inclusion.
Fifth, Eb` for a label ` occurring at a key generation. This set records all abstract
values that are encrypted with the key generated at ` for the preceding asymmetric
decryption results described by b. The bit-string b has the same meaning as for the
variables Sb` (the point of interest is the occurrence of ` in the protocol). The possible
values of these variables are sets of abstract values AVH , ordered by subset inclusion.
Sixth, Lb`,true and L
b
`,false for labels ` at let- and while-statements. They denote
whether the true- (default-) and false-branch of the statement are alive or not. The bit-
string has the same meaning as before. The possible values of these variables are false
and true, ordered by false ≤ true.
3.3 Constraints
There are two sources for constraints — the protocol and the adversary. The first de-
scribes the movement of values during the computations performed by the protocol,
while the second describes the capabilities of the adversary in decomposing messages.
This second set of constraints, given in Fig. 1 is quite straightforward: The first two
constraints are obvious — the adversary can retrieve stored payloads and decompose
lists. The third constraint states that the adversary can decrypt a symmetric encryption
if it has the key. The relation ∼=P relates two abstract values if the sets of terms they
correspond to may intersect. Because the meaning of AnyPubVal depends on the ad-
versary’s knowledge, this relation must also depend on it. The relation ∼=P is the least
reflexive, symmetric and structure-respecting relation on abstract values that satisfies
the conditions given in Fig. 2. The fourth constraint for the adversary’s capabilities
states that if the public key used for public encryption may have been created by the
adversary (which means that the secret key was also created by the adversary) then the
adversary may find out the plaintext. The fifth and sixth constraints state that the ad-
versary is capable of determining the identity of the key used to produce the ciphertext.
store(AV ) ∈ P⇒ AV ∈ P
(AV 1, . . . ,AV j) ∈ P⇒ AV i ∈ P
symenc(AV k,AV t, `, b) ∈ P⇒
(∃AV ′ ∈ P : AV k ∼=P AV ′)⇒ AV t ∈ P
pubenc(AnyPubVal,AV t, `, b) ∈ P⇒ AV t ∈ P
pubenc(AV k,AV t, `, b) ∈ P⇒ AV k ∈ P
symenc(symkey(i, `, b),AV t, `
′, b′) ∈ P⇒
symkeyname(`, b) ∈ P
{XP,AnyPubVal} ⊆ P
Fig. 1. Constraints describing the adversary’s power
AV ∈ P⇒ AV ∼=P AnyPubVal
store(XP) ∼=P AnyPubVal(∀i : AV i ∼=P AV ′i) ∧ (AV ′1, . . . ,AV ′j) ∼=P AnyPubVal
⇒ (AV 1, . . . ,AV j) ∼=P AnyPubVal
(AnyPubVal, . . . ,AnyPubVal) ∼=P AnyPubVal
AV k ∼=P AV ′k ∧AV t ∼=P AV ′t ∧ pubenc(AV ′k,AV ′t, `, b) ∈ P
⇒ pubenc(AV k,AV t, `, b) ∼=P AnyPubVal
AV k ∼=P AV ′k ∧AV t ∼=P AV ′t ∧ symenc(AV ′k,AV ′t, `, b) ∈ P
⇒ symenc(AV k,AV t, `, b) ∼=P AnyPubVal
XS ∼=P XP
Fig. 2. The “possibly equal” relation ∼=P
For asymmetric encryption, this identity is the public key itself, while for symmetric
encryption, it is the symkeyname. Finally, the public values XP and AnyPubVal may be
known to the adversary.
The set of constraints generated by an input or output process P is given by the
mapping 〈〈〈P 〉〉〉 that we are going to define below. For defining it, we also define the
following mappings.
– 〈〈e〉〉(I, b) gives the set of abstract values for the result of evaluating the expression e
when the decryption context (after evaluating e) is b and the abstractions of already
defined variables are given by the mapping I.
– 〈〈e〉〉s(I) and 〈〈e〉〉f(I) give some necessary conditions for the evaluation of e to
succeed or fail.
– 〈〈e〉〉E(I,L) gives the set of constraints for the variablesEb`, as generated by e. Here
L is a boolean showing whether this expression is live code.
– bbx := ecc(b,X, y), where X gives the abstractions of variables defined before the
assignment x := e, and y is either x or a variable occurring in e gives a set of
abstract values that certainly abstracts the value of y after the successful evaluation
of e. The mapping bbx := ecc is used to collect the relationships between values of
variables.
The relationships between variables allow us to make the analysis more precise — they
bound the abstractions of values of variables from above. When combining several of
these upper bounds, we have to form their greatest lower bound. While the least upper
bound of two sets of abstract values may be just the union of sets, the greatest lower
bound cannot be simply the intersection because when two sets of abstract values A
and B are both valid abstractions of some concrete value then we want their greatest
lower bound A ∩˙ B be a valid abstraction of that value as well. But certain concrete
values may correspond to several different abstract values, for example a nonce that has
become known to the adversary may occur in our abstractions either as nonce(`, b) for
some ` and b or as AnyPubVal.
For defining ∩˙, we first define a partial binary operation u on abstract values as the
smallest (i.e. defined for as few arguments as possible) idempotent symmetric structure-
preserving operation that satisfies AVH u AnyPubVal = AVH for any abstract value
AVH defined in (1). Now we can just define A ∩˙B = {AV uAV ′ |AV ∈ A,AV ′ ∈
B}. We also define A ⊆˙ B iff A ∩˙B = A.
The mappings 〈〈e〉〉, 〈〈e〉〉s, 〈〈e〉〉f and 〈〈e〉〉E are given in Figures 3 and 4. If we have
left out the definition of 〈〈e〉〉s or 〈〈e〉〉f for some e then it is true. If we have left out the
definition of 〈〈e〉〉E for some e then it is ∅. In Fig. 4, La [resp. Ls] denotes the set of all
labels ` occurring in the protocol in the positions keypair` [resp. gen symenc key(i)`].
In Fig. 3 we can see the special treatment of AnyPubVal — for example, payloads
can be extracted from it and projections can be taken. The result is still a public value.
During encryption, AnyPubVal may serve as the encryption key (of course, such ci-
phertexts can be decrypted by the adversary). During decryption, when the ciphertext
is AnyPubVal, we use the variables Eb` to determine the possible plaintexts.
The distinction between participant-generated and adversarially generated cipher-
texts in public-key decryption can be seen in two definitions for 〈〈pubdec(xk, xt)〉〉.
First of them assumes that the ciphertext is generated by some protocol participant,
while the second assumes that the adversary is the source of the ciphertext. Both of
these cases are also present in symmetric decryption, but they have been joined to-
gether, so that the analysis does not handle them separately.
The relationships between newly defined and existing variables are given by
bbx := ecc(b,X, y), defined in Fig. 5. Recall that it gives for a variable y a set of abstract
values that is guaranteed to abstract its concrete value. If the definition is missing for
some bbx := ecc(b,X, y) in Fig. 5, it is equal to X(y) (i.e. no precision is gained). In
Fig. 5, the message constructor C may be one of list, pubenc` or privenc`. The corre-
sponding abstract value constructorC is then either the list constructor, pubenc(·, ·, `, b)
or privenc(·, ·, `, b).
The usage of bbx := eccmay become clearer when we look at the constraints gener-
ated by processes. This generation is done by 〈〈〈P 〉〉〉(I, b,L,C) where I is a constraint
variable describing the protocol state before the execution of the process P , the bit-
string b is the current decryption context, the variable L denotes whether this process
is alive, and C is a set of constraints of the form X(x) ⊆˙ E where E is a monotone
〈〈n〉〉(I, b) = {XP} 〈〈x〉〉(I, b) = I(x)
〈〈keypair`〉〉(I, b) = {seckey(`, b)}
〈〈store(x)〉〉(I, b) = {store(AV ) |AV ∈ I(x)}
〈〈retrieve(x)〉〉(I, b) =
{AV | store(AV ) ∈ I(x)} ∪ {XP |AnyPubVal ∈ I(x)}
〈〈list(x1, . . . , xk)〉〉(I, b) = {(AV 1, . . . ,AV k) |AV i ∈ I(xi)}
〈〈gen symenc key(i)`〉〉(I, b) = {symkey(i, `, b)}
〈〈piji (x)〉〉(I, b) = {AV i | (AV 1, . . . ,AV k) ∈ I(x)}∪
{AnyPubVal |AnyPubVal ∈ I(x)}
〈〈pubkey(x)〉〉(I, b) = {pubkey(`, b) | seckey(`, b) ∈ I(x)}
〈〈gen nonce〉〉(I, b) = {nonce(`, b)}
〈〈pubenc`(xk, xt)〉〉(I, b) = {pubenc(AV k,AV t, `, b) |
AV k ∈ I(xk),AV t ∈ I(xt),AV k = pubkey(. . .)}∪
{pubenc(AnyPubVal,AV t, `, b) |
AnyPubVal ∈ I(xk),AV t ∈ I(xt)}
〈〈privenc`(xk, xt)〉〉(I, b) = {symenc(AV k,AV t, `, b) |
AV k ∈ I(xk),AV t ∈ I(xt),AV k = symkey(. . .)}∪
{symenc(AnyPubVal,AV t, `, b) |
AnyPubVal ∈ I(xk),AV t ∈ I(xt)}
〈〈privdec(xk, xt)〉〉(I, b) =
{AV p | symenc(AV k,AV p, `′, b′) ∈ I(xt),
AV ′k ∈ I(xk),AV k ∼=P AV ′k}∪
{AnyPubVal |AnyPubVal ∈ I(xt), I(xk) ∩P 6= ∅}∪
if AnyPubVal ∈ I(xt) then
⋃
symkey(i,`,b)∈I(xk)
Eb` else ∅
〈〈pubdec(xk, xt)〉〉(I, b1) =
{AV p | pubenc(pubkey(`′′, b′′),AV p, `′, b′) ∈ I(xt),
seckey(`′′, b′′) ∈ I(xk)}∪
if AnyPubVal ∈ I(xt) then
⋃
seckey(`,b)∈I(xk)
Eb` else ∅
〈〈pubdec(xk, xt)〉〉(I, b0) = {AnyPubVal |AnyPubVal ∈ I(xt)}
Fig. 3. Abstract semantics of expressions: mapping 〈〈e〉〉
〈〈n〉〉f(I) = false 〈〈x〉〉f(I) = false
〈〈keypair`〉〉f(I) = false 〈〈store(x)〉〉f(I) = false
〈〈retrieve(x)〉〉s(I) =
AnyPubVal ∈ I(x) ∨ ∃AV : store(AV ) ∈ I(x)
〈〈retrieve(x)〉〉f(I) = ∃AV ∈ I(x) : AV 6= store(. . .)
〈〈list(x1, . . . , xk)〉〉s(I) = ∀i : ∃AV ∈ I(xi) : AV 6= seckey(. . .)
〈〈list(x1, . . . , xk)〉〉f(I) = ∃i : ∃AV ∈ I(xi) : AV = seckey(. . .)
〈〈gen symenc key(i)`〉〉f(I) = false
〈〈piji (x)〉〉s(I) = AnyPubVal ∈ I(x) ∨ ∃(AV i, . . . ,AV j) ∈ I(x)
〈〈piji (x)〉〉f(I) = ∃AV ∈ I(x) : AV 6= (AV 1, . . . ,AV j)
〈〈pubkey(x)〉〉s(I) = ∃`, b : seckey(`, b) ∈ I(x)
〈〈pubkey(x)〉〉f(I) = ∃AV ∈ I(x) : AV 6= seckey(. . .)
〈〈gen nonce〉〉f(I) = false
〈〈pubenc`(xk, xt)〉〉s(I) =
AnyPubVal ∈ I(xk) ∨ ∃`′, b′ : pubkey(`′, b′) ∈ I(xk)
〈〈pubenc`(xk, xt)〉〉E(I,L) =
{pubkey(`′, b′) ∈ I(xk) ∧ L⇒ I(xt) ⊆ Eb
′
`′ | `′ ∈ La}
〈〈privenc`(xk, xt)〉〉s(I) =
AnyPubVal ∈ I(xk) ∨ ∃i, `′, b′ : symkey(i, `′, b′) ∈ I(xk)
〈〈privenc`(xk, xt)〉〉E(I,L) =
{symkey(i, `′, b′) ∈ I(xk) ∧ L⇒ I(xt) ⊆ Eb
′
`′ | `′ ∈ Ls}
〈〈privdec(xk, xt)〉〉s(I) =
AnyPubVal ∈ I(xk) ∨ ∃i, `′, b′ : seckey(`′, b′) ∈ I(xk)
〈〈pubdec(xk, xt)〉〉s(I) = ∃`′, b′ : seckey(`′, b′) ∈ I(xk)
Fig. 4. Abstract semantics of expressions: mappings 〈〈e〉〉s, 〈〈e〉〉f and 〈〈e〉〉E
expression with respect to X that evaluates to a set of abstract values. The constraints
in C relate the abstract values of variables that have been defined before the execution
bbx := C(x1, . . . , xk)cc(b,X, x) =
{C(AV 1, . . . ,AV k) |AV i ∈ X(xi)}
bbx := C(x1, . . . , xk)cc(b,X, xi) =
{AV i |C(AV 1, . . . ,AV k) ∈ X(x)}
bbx := piji (y)cc(b,X, x) = {AV i | (AV 1, . . . ,AV k) ∈ X(y)}
∪ {AnyPubVal |AnyPubVal ∈ X(y)}
bbx := piji (y)cc(b,X, y) =
{(AV ′1, . . . ,AV ′i−1,AV i uAV ′i,AV ′i+1, . . . ,AV ′j) |
AV i ∈ X(x), (AV ′1, . . . ,AV ′j) ∈ X(y)}∪
{(AnyPubVali−1,AV i,AnyPubValj−i) |
AV i ∈ X(x),AnyPubVal ∈ X(y)}
bbx := ycc(b,X, x) = X(y)
bbx := ycc(b,X, y) = X(x)
bby := pubkey(x)cc(b,X, y) =
{pubkey(`, b′) | seckey(`, b′) ∈ X(x)}
bby := pubkey(x)cc(b,X, x) =
{seckey(`, b′) | pubkey(`, b′) ∈ X(x)}
bby := pubdec(xk, xt)cc(b1,X, y) = if AnyPubVal ∈ X(xk)
then X(y) else
⋃
seckey(`′,b′)∈X(xk)
Eb
′
`′
bby := privdec(xk, xt)cc(b,X, y) = if AnyPubVal ∈ X(xk)
then X(y) else
⋃
symkey(i,`′,b′)∈X(xk)
Eb
′
`′
Fig. 5. Constraints giving the relationships between values of variables
of P . If C contains a constraint X(x) ⊆˙ E then the result of E is a suitable abstraction
for the value of x.
Let R be a mapping from variables to sets of abstract values, and let C be a set
of constraints in the form X(x) ⊆˙ E. We let L(R,C) denote the greatest solution to
the constraints C (with X as the variable) that is less than or equal to R. The mapping
〈〈〈P 〉〉〉 is given in Fig. 6.
Let us explain the generated constraints. For an assignment, the following con-
straints are generated. If the process is alive (L is true) and the expression e may suc-
ceed [resp. fail] then we demand that the boolean variable reflecting that —Lb`,true [resp.
Lb`,false] is true, too. If e may succeed and hence L
b
`,true is true then we let the mapping
Rb` be (at least) the mapping I, but additionally we fix the abstraction of the left-hand
side y. Here this “at least” means “equal to” because there will be no other constraints
for Rb`. If L
b
`,true is false then R
b
` has no constraints, hence it maps everything to ∅.
The set of constraints C′〈b〉 includes all the relationships between variables that
are defined up to the successful execution of y := e. Note that the inequality signs in
the constraints in C′〈b〉 has the opposite direction from the inequality signs in the con-
straints generated by 〈〈〈P 〉〉〉. The constraint Sb` ≥ L(Rb`,C′〈b〉) states that Sb` contains
basically the same abstractions as Rb`, but all recorded relationships between variables
have been taken into account. As this constraint is the only one for Sb`, the inequality
Sb` ≤ Rb` always holds.
We also add the constraints for the variablesEb
′
`′ and we recursively invoke 〈〈〈·〉〉〉 for
the default- and the false-branch. The arguments for these recursive calls are also worth
noting. We see that as we pass through the protocol, we collect the constraints express-
ing the relationships between variables. For the default-branch, Sb` is the abstraction of
the initial state, while for the false-branch, the same mapping I is used because no vari-
able was assigned to if the evaluation of e failed. Also we collect no new relationships
between variables if e fails (although it would be possible for some e, we have found
that it does not change the precision of the analysis in practice).
If e is a public-key decryption then we have “two different default-branches”, with
decryption contexts b1 and b0. These two default-branches are reflected in the variables
Rb1` , S
b1
` , R
b0
` , S
b0
` , as well as in two invocations of 〈〈〈·〉〉〉 for the default-branch P .
Consider now other cases for the process P . In an if-statement we check whether
the abstractions of x and x′ may intersect. We also add the equality of x and x′ to the
set of constraints C′.
A send-command always succeeds, the intended recipient becomes known to the
adversary and the message is recorded as occurring on the channel c and/or becoming
known to the adversary.
In a receive-statement (no matter whether replicated or not), a message from the
adversary is abstracted as AnyPubVal and a message from the user as a secret payload.
The sender of the message is already known to the adversary, hence xp is a public
integer. No new constraints are added, hence the invocation of L is not needed for Sb`.
If Ii is the program for the machine Pi then the set of constraints for the protocol
is the union of 〈〈〈Ii〉〉〉({}, ε, true, ∅) over all i, where {} is the mapping with empty
domain. Together with the constraints in Fig. 1, they make up the entire constraint
system that we have to solve.
Suppose that we have solved the constraint system for some protocol ℘. Let ` be a
label occurring in this protocol (labeling a subprocess P ). Let Ib` denote the variable S
b′
`′
If e is a not a public-key decryption then
〈〈〈let` y := e in P else P ′〉〉〉(I, b,L,C) =
let C′〈b〉 = C ∪ {X(y) ⊆˙ bbecc(b,X, y) | y ∈ Var•`} in
{L ∧ 〈〈e〉〉s(I)⇒ Lb`,true, L ∧ 〈〈e〉〉f(I)⇒ Lb`,false,
Lb`,true ⇒ Rb` ≥ I[y 7→ 〈〈e〉〉(I, b)], Sb` ≥ L(Rb`,C′〈b〉)}∪
〈〈e〉〉E(I,Lb`,true) ∪ 〈〈〈P 〉〉〉(Sb`, b,Lb`,true,C′〈b〉)∪
〈〈〈P ′〉〉〉(I, b,Lb`,false,C)
If e is a public-key decryption then
〈〈〈let` y := e in P else P ′〉〉〉(I, b,L,C) =
let C′〈b〉 = C ∪ {X(y) ⊆˙ bbecc(b,X, y) | y ∈ Var•`} in
{L ∧ 〈〈e〉〉s(I)⇒ Lb`,true, L ∧ 〈〈e〉〉f(I)⇒ Lb`,false,
Lb`,true ⇒ Rb1` ≥ I[y 7→ 〈〈e〉〉(I, b1)], Sb1` ≥ L(Rb1` ,C′〈b1〉),
Lb`,true ⇒ Rb0` ≥ I[y 7→ 〈〈e〉〉(I, b0)], Sb0` ≥ L(Rb0` ,C′〈b0〉)}∪
〈〈e〉〉E(I,Lb`,true) ∪ 〈〈〈P 〉〉〉(Sb1` , b1,Lb`,true,C′〈b1〉)∪
〈〈〈P 〉〉〉(Sb0` , b0,Lb`,true,C′〈b0〉) ∪ 〈〈〈P ′〉〉〉(I, b,Lb`,false,C)
〈〈〈if ` x = x′ then P else P ′〉〉〉(I, b,L,C) =
let C′ = C ∪ {X(x) ⊆˙ X(x′),X(x′) ⊆˙ X(x)} in
{L ∧ (∃AV ∈ I(x) ∃AV ′ ∈ I(x′) : AV ∼=P AV ′)⇒ Lb`,true,
L⇒ Lb`,false, Rb` ≥ I, Sb` ≥ L(Rb`,C′)}∪
〈〈〈P 〉〉〉(Sb`, b,Lb`,true,C′) ∪ 〈〈〈P ′〉〉〉(I, b,Lb`,false,C)
〈〈〈sendc[xp](x).I∗〉〉〉(I, b,L,C) = 〈〈〈I∗〉〉〉(I, b,L,C)∪
{L⇒ I(xp) ⊆ P,
L ∧ (c ∈ Chans ∪Chana)⇒ I(x) ⊆ Cc,
L ∧ (c ∈ Chana ∪Chani)⇒ I(x) ⊆ P}
〈〈〈(!)receive`c[xp](x).P 〉〉〉(I, b,L,C) =
{L⇒ L`b,true, Sb` ≥ Rb`} ∪ 〈〈〈P 〉〉〉(Sb`, b,Lb`,true,C)∪
{L⇒ Rb` ≥ I[x 7→ Cc, xp 7→ {XP}]},
if c ∈ Chans ∪Chana
{L⇒ Rb` ≥ I[x 7→ {AnyPubVal}, xp 7→ {XP}]},
if c ∈ Chani
{L⇒ Rb` ≥ I[x 7→ {XS}, xp 7→ {XP}]},
if c ∈ Chanu
〈〈〈I1 | · · · | In〉〉〉(I, b,L,C) =
n⋃
i=1
〈〈〈Ii〉〉〉(I, b,L,C)
〈〈〈0〉〉〉(I, b,L,C) = 〈〈〈II〉〉〉(I, b,L,C) = ∅ .
Fig. 6. Constraints generated by processes
(or the empty mapping) that occurs as the first argument in the call 〈〈〈P `〉〉〉(I, b,L,C),
invoked during the construction of constraints for ℘. That is, Ib` gives the abstract values
of variables before entering the subprocess labeled with ` in the context b.
The following theorem states how the security of a protocol can be established using
our analysis.
Theorem 1. Let ℘ be a protocol and let Let Sb`, Eb`, P, Cc, Lb`,b be such that the con-
straints given above are fulfilled. If the following conditions hold then the composition
of machines THn and Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) preserves the secrecy of payloads, i.e., the pay-
loads are cryptographically secret if THn is replaced by its cryptographic realization.
(I) If the protocol contains a statement of the form if ` x = x′ . . . then XS 6∈ Ib`(x),
XS 6∈ Ib`(x′), store(XS) 6∈ Ib`(x) and store(XS) 6∈ Ib`(x′) for any b.
(II) If XS ∈ Sb`(x) for some b, x, and this x occurs as an argument to some operation
where the abstract values at entry are given by Sb`, then this operation is store or a
send to a user.
(III) XS 6∈ P.
(IV) If AV ∈ Eb` and a symm. key of order i is generated at ` then the order of AV is less
than i.
– The order of symkey(i, `, b) is i. The order of a tuple is the maximum order of
its members. The order of other abstract values is 0.
(V) symkey(i, `, b) 6∈ P for any i, `, b.
4 Implementation
We find the (componentwise) least solution for the aforementioned collection of in-
equalities. The least fixed point is computed iteratively, using a version of the solver
from [65], which is specifically tailored to systems of constraints. The computation
might not terminate but we believe that this is not a problem for real protocols; in fact,
we have never encountered this situation when we applied our tool to common protocols
of the literature. The only case in which computation is not guaranteed to terminate is if
the protocol is able to create terms of arbitrary complexity all by itself, without the help
from the adversary. We also believe that the potentially exponential number of variables
in the size of the protocol is not a problem in practice because protocol descriptions are
short.
There are ways to deal with the divergence of the fixed-point computation (add suit-
able widenings). Also, we believe that the exponential number of sets can be represented
in a more compact way, if necessary.
The value of L(R,C) is also computed iteratively, using the same solution method.
The mapping X is initialized with R and the iteration proceeds downwards.
The constraint generator and solver have been implemented in O’Caml (version
3.09 was used to compile it to native code). We have tested the analyser on several
protocols from the literature, namely Needham-Schroeder public key [66], its fix by
Lowe [8], Otway-Rees [67], Yahalom, and its modification by Burrows et. al [68]. The
goal of all these protocols is to exchange a symmetric key between two parties. We use
our analysis to find out whether it is safe to use the exchanged key to protect secret
payloads in transit over public networks. We have thus added an extra message at the
end of the protocol sessions in all of these protocols. This extra message contains a
secret payload encrypted under the freshly exchanged key. (Note again that we do not
consider real-or-random secrecy of the keys in this paper, but secrecy of the (encrypted)
payloads.) Our analysis considers all these protocols secure, except for the original
(and indeed flawed) Needham-Schroeder protocol. If one allows old session keys to
become known to the adversary, there may be attacks that are not discovered by our
analyser since the BPW model does not consider the leakage of secret keys that have
been used (this would cause a so-called commitment problem which makes a proof of
computational soundness in the sense of BRSIM/UC impossible). Problems with the
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe and the modified Yahalom protocol have been published
[42, 69] but these problems do not affect payload secrecy properties — they do not
allow an adversary to learn the new key or inject its own key which could then be used
to learn information on the payload. The running times of the analyser on a computer
with 1 GHz Intel Celeron processor and 256 MB of main memory are between one and
eight seconds for these protocols with less than two seconds for Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe and both versions of Yahalom.
5 Correctness of the Analysis
Theorem 1 is a straightforward corollary of a lemma similar to subject reduction. We are
going to give the statement of that lemma here, and for the sake of readability postpone
the technical proof to [70].
When arguing about the correctness, we need to distinguish public and secret pay-
loads. Hence we change the semantics of the system a little bit and assume that each
payload is labeled with its secrecy level. An integer received from the protocol user is
labeled as secret; a constant integer or the apparent sender of some message is labeled as
public. When the payloads are stored in the database of terms then the labels are stored
as well. They are also retrieved together with labels. When two integers are compared
their secrecy levels are ignored.
Let R be a run of the protocol (a finite sequence of steps). Let O be the state of the
database of THn at the end of this run. Let x be a protocol variable whose definition
occurs under k replications. If the variable x has been assigned a value inside the i1-
th replica of the outermost replication, i2-th replica of the next replication, etc., then
we denote this value O(x, [i1, . . . , ik]). This value is either a handle to a term in O, a
secret integer, or a public integer. Similarly, if a program point ` inside k replications
and (syntactically) preceded by n public-key decryptions then let O(`, [i1, . . . , ik]) be
the n-bit string whose bits describe the source of n ciphertexts whose decryptions are
visible at the point ` in the replica [i1, . . . , ik]. Note that a ciphertext is a term in the
database O and its creator is simply the first principal that had a handle to it.
For a set T of terms in the database O we let its downwards closure T be the small-
est set of terms containing T and being closed with respect to list projection, decryption
with keys in T, and extracting the public keys and symmetric key names from cipher-
texts. For an abstract value AV we define its semantics [[AV ]]O with respect to the
contents of the database O. The semantics is either a set of terms in O or a set of pay-
loads.
– [[XP]]O = {“public n” |n ∈ N}.
– [[XS]]O = {“secret n” |n ∈ N}.
– [[store(AV )]]O is the set of all terms of type data in O whose argument belongs to
[[AV ]]O.
– [[nonce(`, b)]]O is the set of all terms of type nonce in O that are generated by
the gen nonce-expressions at the protocol point ` at replicas [i1, . . . , ik], such that
b = O(`, [i1, . . . , ik])
– [[symkey(i, `, b)]]O, [[symkeyname(`, b)]]O, [[seckey(`, b)]]O, and [[pubkey(`, b)]]O —
defined the same way as [[nonce(`, b)]]O (only replace nonce with skse, pkse, ske,
or pke).
– [[(AV 1, . . . ,AV j)]]O is the set of all terms of type list in O whose length is j and
whose i-th component term (1 ≤ i ≤ j) belongs to [[AV i]]O.
– [[pubenc(AV k,AV p, `, b)]]O is the set of all terms of type enc, such that
• they have been created by the pubenc-expressions at the protocol point ` at
replicas [i1, . . . , ik], such that b = O(`, [i1, . . . , ik]);
• the term corresponding to the public key must belong to [[AV k]]O;
• the term corresponding to the plaintext must belong to [[AV p]]O.
– [[symenc(AV k,AV p, `, b)]]O is defined similarly, where enc is replaced with
symenc.
– [[AnyPubVal]]O is the downwards closure of the set of all terms that the adversary
knows.
Let P˜ be the largest set that P˜ ⊆ P\{AnyPubVal} and
(AV 1, . . . ,AV j) ∈ P˜ implies AV i ∈ P˜ for 1 ≤ i ≤ j. Informally, P˜ is obtained
from P by deleting AnyPubVal and also any abstract value that is a list, one of whose
components (after flattening lists) is AnyPubVal. The set P˜ is a better characterization
than P for the set of terms created by honest participants and learned by the adversary.
Definition 1. A term T from the downwards closure of the set of all terms known to
the adversary is adversarially well-constructed with respect to P if one of the following
holds:
– ∃AV ∈ P˜, such that T ∈ [[AV ]]O.
– All immediate subterms of T (the immediate subterm of a public key or a symmetric
key name is the corresponding secret key) are known to the adversary and are also
adversarially well-constructed. Also, if T is of type nonce, ske, enc, garbage, skse,
symenc then T must have been constructed by the adversary.
That is, a term is adversarially well-constructed if the adversary knows how to construct
this term from the terms that the analysis has found him to know.
Lemma 1 (Subject reduction). Let ℘ be a protocol and let Let Sb`, Eb`, P, Cc, Lb`,b be
such that the constraints given in Sec. 3.3 are fulfilled. LetR be a run of the protocol ℘.
Let O be the state of the database of THn at the end of R. The following claims hold.
P If a term T is known to adversary then it is adversarially well-constructed wrt. P.
X If O(x, [i1, . . . , ik]) = T (here T may be both a term or an immediate value) and
the replica [i1, . . . , ik] passes through the point ` with the operation at ` succeeding
and the value of x being defined, then there exists AV ∈ SO(`,[i1,...,ik])` (x), such
that T ∈ [[AV ]]O.
C If a term T is communicated over an abstract channel c ∈ Chans ∪Chana then
there exists AV ∈ Cc, such that T ∈ [[AV ]]O.
E If Tk is the term representing an asymmetric or symmetric key generated at the
program point ` in the replica [i1, . . . , ik]) and Tp is a term that occurs as the
plaintext in an encryption where Tk is the key, then at least one of the following
holds:
• there exists AV ∈ EO(`,[i1,...,ik])` , such that Tp ∈ [[AV ]]O.
• Tk and Tp are both known to the adversary and the term representing encryp-
tion of Tp with Tk is constructed by the adversary.
L If ` is a branching point in the protocol (a let- or if -statement) and if theB-branch
was taken at the replica [i1, . . . , ik] (here B is either true/default or false), then
L
O(`,[i1,...,ik])
`,B = true.
The lemma is proved by induction over the length of R.
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